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IS GENDER JUSTICE A COMPLETED AGENDA?
THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICA: How WOMEN'S VALUES ARE
CHANGING OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES. By Elinor Lenz' and
Barbara Myerhoff. 2 Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc. I985.
Pp. 276. $15.95.
Reviewed by Catharine Hantzis3
The central argument of The Feminization of America is somewhat
surprising and strangely compelling. Lenz and Myerhoff argue that
women largely have won their struggle to enter the public sphere of
American life and that, in the process, they have transformed both
public and private spheres in ways that have produced more egalitar-
ian relationships and greater human happiness. Because this trans-
formation is nearing completion, the authors argue, we should put
aside the feminist injunction to put women first; we should get, in
their phrase, "beyond feminism" (p. 226). If their argument is correct,
it has significant legal and political consequences. For example, if it
is true that women are no longer disadvantaged, then courts might
be justified in scrutinizing claims of gender discrimination less care-
fully and legislatures in concluding that policy choices favoring women
are unnecessary and undesirable.
Because of the importance of this issue, it seems inevitable that a
book such as The Feminization of America would be written. Women
have spent the last century arguing that fairness requires equal treat-
ment for women, and there is some evidence suggesting that, in the
last decade, they have been heard. For example, in the last ten years,
our conception of gender roles has changed dramatically, and these
rapidly changing conceptions have produced some equally dramatic
changes in the workplace and in the home. Women have entered the
courtroom and the construction site; men have found their way to the
supermarkets and the laundromats. Even the Harvard Law Review
prints articles in which "she" is used as a pronoun for a hypothetical
judge. With all this visible change, someone was bound to conclude
that enough change has occurred that gender justice can be considered
a completed agenda.
The question raised by Lenz and Myerhoff's analysis is the difficult
one of how we decide when we have had "enough change." When
do we say that racism and sexism have been eliminated from American
society? As the ongoing debate over equal opportunity versus equal
I Educational consultant and lecturer.
2 Professor of Anthropology, University of Southern California (deceased).
3 Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
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outcomes makes plain, this question is not entirely empirical. 4 It is,
in part, a question about the extent of this society's aspiration to
provide justice to disadvantaged groups. It is also a question about
the nature of discrimination and oppression. If, for example, one
believes that racism and sexism operate in an often unapprehended
way to exclude blacks and women from certain kinds of professional
advancement, the mere assurance that an institution will not use race
or gender as a formal criterion for advancement will not seem like
"enough change." Furthermore, when one addresses this question
with respect to women in particular, it is complicated by the fact that
women are different from men in at least one undeniable and relevant
respect. Child bearing and rearing require, at this point in history,
more of a commitment from mothers than they do from fathers. In
an equal and just society, how should this fact be treated?
Lenz and Myerhoff confront the issue of "enough change" in two
ways. First, it is clear that one of the reasons they think there has
been "enough change" is that women appear to be better off than they
once were. Second, they suggest that we can expect even more rapid
improvement in the future because, in their view, the dominant male
culture, which has traditionally enforced sexist values and policies,
has begun to be transformed by an infusion of female culture.
My purpose in writing this Review is twofold. First, I will ex-
amine Lenz and Myerhoff's factual claims to see whether they are
correct either about the current condition of women or about the
spread of female culture. The second part relates to the notion of
female culture. Is it a transformative culture, as the authors suggest?
The title of their book suggests an ambiguity - do the authors think
that women face a feminist future or a "feminine"5 one? If we take
their description of female culture as a vision of what the future holds,
will that culture free women or further oppress them?
I. THE CONDITION OF WOMEN: FEMALE CULTURE AS A PICTURE
OF THE PRESENT
The claim that America has been feminized cannot, as a factual
matter, be substantiated, whether it is interpreted as a claim about
the status of women or as a claim about the spread of female culture.
Economically, it is questionable whether women have grounds for
4 See, e.g., Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of
Equal Protection, i31 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983); Schar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond,
9 NOMOS 228 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967).
5 Susan Brownmiller argues that the ideal of femininity is one that has traditionally limited
women both physically and emotionally. See S. BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY (1984). Lenz and
Myerhoff do not seem to recognize the risk that celebrating female culture and values may
reaffirm their oppressive characteristics.
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celebration. Recent figures show that female-headed households are
becoming poorer in comparison with households headed by male wage
earners: the average income for a female-headed household has de-
clined to fifty-two percent of the average income received by a male-
headed household. 6 Although more women are working, the work-
place itself is still highly segregated. A disproportionate number of
women are still poorly paid secretaries, nurses, and teachers. Women
in sales still sell cosmetics, not high-ticket, commissionable items.
Women still assemble electronics at minimum wage while men drive
trucks and assemble cars at union rates.7
It is true that women have entered several well paid professions
in large numbers. Law schools, business schools, and graduate schools
have turned out an army of female professionals who have taken their
places in the traditional male world.8 Although these pioneers are
highly visible evidence that some change has occured, a closer ex-
amination of their actual experience suggests that they present some-
what questionable evidence that America has been "feminized." For-
tunately, two recent books - Where They Are Now: The Story of
the Women of Harvard Law 19749 and Women Like Us10 - tell us
their stories. These books reveal a picture very different from that
painted by Lenz and Myerhoff. Professional women are, with rare
exception, suffering many of the marginalizing effects of tokenism,"
6 Although 6o% is the typically cited figure, by 1978, the average income of female-headed
households had already declined to 52% of the income of male-headed households. See PANEL
ON STATISTICS FOR FAMILY ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS, FAMILY ASSISTANCE AND
POVERTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATISTICAL NEEDS 38-40 (D. Gilford, D. Affholter & L. Ingram
eds. 1983). The disparity is even greater when female-headed households are compared to two-
income families. The average family with one woman wage-earner receives only 38% of the
income received by two-income families. See id. at 40. Although this comparison may seem
unfair, it emphasizes that the poor in the United States are mostly women, many of whom are
single.
7 For a general discussion of sex segregation in the workplace, see SEX SEGREGATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES (B. Reskin ed. 1984); P. Roos, GENDER
AND WORK: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 50-52 (1985); Belier, Occu-
pational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, I COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 8OS 23 (June 6-7, 1984).
8 It is important to note that when women came to be admitted to law schools in large
numbers, they filled only some of the places created in the era of law school expansion during
the I96os and I97Os. From 1963 to 1978, law school enrollments soared from 49,000 to 122,000.
In that time total female enrollments went from 2000 to 37,000. Thus, while there were 35,000
additional women entering law schools by 1978, there were also 38,000 additional men. See C.
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 53 (Ig8I).
9 J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY ARE Now: THE STORY OF THE WOMEN OF
HARVARD LAw 1974 (T986).
10 L. GALLESE, WOMEN LIKE Us (1985).
11 Lenz and Myerhoff claim: "One change that is a significant outcome of feminization is the
demise of the 'token woman,' hired during the early days of affirmative action as a gesture of
appeasement to the women's movement and who, in her isolation, felt constrained to conform
[Vol. ioo:69o
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struggling against the career constraints posed by child bearing and
rearing, 12 receiving lower salaries and facing lower prospects of suc-
cess than their male classmates, 13 and confronting the serious danger
of hitting a professional ceiling at the levels of middle management
and junior partnership. 14
Legally and politically, the outlook for women is no better. Many
of the measures that women have proposed to improve their situation
remain unrealized. The equal rights amendment has been defeated;
women's newly won right to make decisions about whether and when
to have children is being challenged; affirmative action has largely
been scuttled by the Justice Department as "reverse" discrimination, 15
and courts have generally been unable to say what it means to treat
men and women equally.16 And if the legal, political, and economic
news is not discouraging enough, one need only observe the fact of
contining victimization; the best empirical evidence is that women
continue to be battered and raped in large numbers.17
so as not to rock the boat" (p. 68). Most of the women interviewed by Gallese and by Abramson
and Franklin appeared to be isolated in their work environment, and some expressed a conviction
that, because of this isolation, it was necessary for them to perform far better than their male
counterparts. See J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, supra note 9, at 62; L. GALLESE, supra note
io, at 295-300.
12 In the chapter entitled "Reshaping the Family," Lenz and Myerhoff acknowledge some of
the real economic and social difficulties facing women who are raising children. But their
suggested answer to these difficulties - more realistic social programs and the new breed of
"loving and involved fathers" (p. xo9) - is simplistic. See infra note i8.
13 See, e.g., J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, supra note 9, at 298; L. GALLESE, supra note
io, at 250.
14 See Hymowitz & Schellhardt, The Corporate Woman: A Special Report, Wall St. J., Mar.
24, 1986, § 4, at i, col. I. This danger is also well documented for black men who have
ventured into corporate life. See G. DAvis & G. WATSON, BLACK LIFE IN CORPORATE AMER-
ICA: SWIMMING IN THE MAINSTREAM (1982).
Is At least one commentator on racial discrimination has argued persuasively that when
discrimination is properly understood, it cannot be "reverse." Racism operates in this society to
exclude blacks from positions of power and privilege. That is discrimination. Affirmative action
cannot therefore be "reverse" discrimination unless there is a radical realignment of racial and
gender privilege. Instead, affirmative action is a claim for justice, addressed to a power structure
that is largely white, either to change the process by which it excludes blacks or to admit that
such a process occurs and make an adjustment for it. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 444, 647-51 (1980).
16 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that an employer's
disability plan that failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid
Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that an employer that gave fertile women employees
the choice of being sterilized or losing jobs that unsafely exposed them to lead was not in
violation of OSHA); Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming
x987).
17 See D. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT 49-50 (1984) (citing statistics showing that over 25% of all women are victims of
completed rapes and that an additional 21% are victims of attempted rapes); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Jan. 30-31, 1978) (estimating
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I assemble these facts to illustrate how truly extraordinary it is
that a celebratory book like The Feminization of America could be
written. How is it possible that two intelligent and respected social
scientists studying women in America today could seriously present
the thesis that America has been "feminized?" The answer is partly
that Lenz and Myerhoff are the victims of a very common type of
misperception. What is new and different (woman corporate presi-
dents, househusbands) are especially visible even if relatively rare.
What does not change (single mothers below the poverty line, unfair
allocations of housework) remains in the background and unobserved.
Thus, the authors report that America, spurred on by "the feminizing
influence," is moving away from many archaic ways of thinking and
behaving toward the promise of a "saner, and more humane world"
(pp. I1-12), but they never seem to notice the many areas of American
life that are still dominated by men and male values.
When two social scientists make such a claim, one expects them
to support it, but the evidence that Lenz and Myerhoff produce is
largely anecdotal. They refer to interviews, academic and popular
literature, and to media commentary on changing personal and profes-
sional lifestyles. One's first response is to request more systematic
empirical data. It is no doubt true that some fathers are taking more
responsibility for child care, but how many fathers and how much
responsibility? Are enough fathers taking enough responsibility that
we should stop thinking that child care is primarily a woman's issue?' 8
Lenz and Myerhoff reach their controversial conclusion by ignoring
the statistical evidence in favor of the anecdotal. In some circum-
stances, such neglect is justified. Statistical studies can mislead and
misstate in a number of ways. Familiar problems arise in counting
certain less visible members of the population. Survey questions are
often poorly phrased and therefore fail to capture the underlying
realities. And finally there is a chicken-and-egg aspect to most statis-
tical conclusions. As Thomas Sowell has asked us: are black people
poor because they are black or because so many of them live in
economically depressed areas?' 9 Statistics will not give us the answer.
Anecdotal evidence, on the other hand, may help us better to under-
that 1.8 million women anually are beaten by their husbands); see also Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE
L.J. 1087 (1986) (discussing the problems that lead to the underreporting and nonprosecution of
rape).
18 See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 262 (1985) (citing evidence
that more than half of the millions of child support awards ordered annually by courts in the
United States go unpaid and unenforced).
19 See T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 80-82 (1984). Or to put the
question a little differently, are black people poor because they live in areas that are economically
depressed, or are certain areas economically depressed because they are inhabited by black
people?
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stand phenomena such as poverty by at least describing how it is
experienced by a poor person. A person can tell us what the problem
is from her perspective and in her own words. This evidence alone
does not give us the complete picture, but it is a valuable first step
in teaching us what to do about her situation. But Lenz and Myerhoff
select their evidence to show only one side of the story. They ignore
the statistical evidence that belies their conclusions. Anecdotal evi-
dence can support the rather obvious claim that some change has
occurred. It cannot, however, document the more controversial claim
that enough change has occurred so that we should readjust our
priorities. The undeniable problem with this claim is that the facts
do not support it.
II. FEMALE CULTURE AS A VISION OF THE FUTURE
With respect to female culture, I believe that the facts are only
part of the story. Although the authors may be premature in their
announcement of victory, they at least attempt to tell us what a victory
for women could look like. This is an important project; aspirations
play a major role in allowing human beings to resist societal expec-
tations that oppress them. Thus, even if we are skeptical about the
current presence of female culture in the male-dominated marketplace,
a significant normative question remains: should women aspire to the
kind of future that Lenz and Myerhoff describe? The answer depends
upon whether female culture is, as Lenz and Myerhoff suggest, a
transformative culture. What is "female culture," and what is its
relationship to gender oppression? Do women, by possessing this
culture, really possess the power to liberate themselves and to trans-
form society?
The authors begin their discussion with the assumption that there
are distinct "male" and "female" cultures. They define culture as
follows:
Culture is a way of life, transmitted from one generation to another,
a collective set of agreements about how to perceive and interpret the
world. It is an adaptive arrangement, consisting of solutions to com-
mon problems, with an enduring though by no means unchanging
pattern. (P. 6).
The difference that the authors identify between male and female
culture is familiar.20 Because women raise children, they have a
20 The authors here are quoting, and in general rely heavily on, the observations about
gender differences reported by Carol Gilligan. Gilligan argues that female moral reasoning is
marked by an ethics of responsibility and caring, whereas male moral reasoning tends to focus
on questions of noninterference and individual rights. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 100 (1982).
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"strong sense of personalism"; they are predisposed to identify with
individuals rather than groups; they empathize with others, especially
those who suffer; and they feel "a responsibility to discern and alleviate
the 'real and recognizable' trouble of this world" (p. 9). Women are
caretakers and nurturers and have developed a psychic mode adapted
to these functions. Because the authors do not describe male culture,
one is left to imagine it as an opposite to female culture. As such, it
would presumably be a less caring, less responsible, more aggressive,
and more group-oriented culture. 2 1
Lenz and Myerhoff's notion of female culture is somewhat impre-
cise and uncritical. For example, on the one hand, they say that
women are more oriented to the individual than to the group; on the
other hand, they describe women as more likely to merge their indi-
vidual self-interest into that of the group (pp. 9-IO). The resulting
picture is confusing. Do women think of others as individuals and
themselves as members of a group? Or are women concerned only
with that type of individual welfare that is achieved through satisfac-
tion of group interests? It seems to me that neither of these general-
izations is very plausible or a very sound basis on which to try to
separate male and female culture.
These twin problems of groups and individuals and of gender
differences are at the heart of the matter. Persons are both individuals
and members of many groups. One important group to which every
individual belongs is his or her gender group. An individual does not
choose this group and cannot withdraw from it. As society is currently
constituted, whether one belongs to one gender group or the other
will determine the broad outlines and many of the details of one's
existence. The very enormity of the consequences that attach to gen-
der identity should make us curious about how gender differences
came to be defined.
At least in terms of public writing, the answer is clear enough.
From ancient Greece to the nineteenth century, it was men who
developed theories about the nature of women and the kind of excel-
lence to which they should aspire. Plato and Aristotle represent two
recurring points of view regarding gender differences. On the one
hand, Plato believed that there were real differences between the sexes
in terms of strength, speed, intelligence, and wisdom. 22 Nonetheless,
21 In this and in many other ways Lenz and Myerhoff reverse the traditional problem of
gender projection. Such projection imagines a "self" with the most desirable characteristics and
then attributes all unwanted characteristics to the "other." The result is "objectification" of the
other. It seems to me that feminists who glorify "female" attributes and denigrate "male"
attributes are attempting counterobjectification rather than pursuing a strategy of liberation.
See pp. 7oo-oi below for further discussion of gender projection.
22 See PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES 694 (REPUBLIC V) (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds.
1963).
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for Plato gender differences were only average differences; he would
allow that any individual female might be smarter and stronger than
some individual man. 23 On the other hand, Aristotle believed that
the differences between men and women were universal; men were
rational beings whereas women, like slaves, derived their secondary
status from their inherent inferiority. 24 Aristotle's conception of the
inferiority of women created a dilemma for him in defining female
virtue. It was necessary that women be said to possess virtue so that
they could be exhorted to it; yet it was equally necessary that they
not share in male virtue, because otherwise there could be no justifi-
cation for male domination. Thus male virtue, for Aristotle, entails
the familiar list: temperance, courage, and justice. A woman's virtue,
on the other hand, was adapted to her station. Hence:
The temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice
of a man and of a woman, are not ... the same; the courage of a
man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this
holds of all other virtues .... All classes must be deemed to have
their special attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a
woman's glory," but this is not equally the glory of man. 25
For both Plato and Aristotle, the issue of gender difference was one
of justification: how was the unequal treatment of women to be jus-
tified? And for both men, the question received the same answer:
inferior treatment was justified by women's inferior nature. Plato, at
least, would allow exceptional women to be treated as men. 26
It was not until the nineteenth century that mainstream philoso-
phers began to see gender differences not as a question of justification
but as a matter for reform. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued in
The Subjection of Women 27 that the differences between men and
women were largely the result not only of social conditioning but also
of real oppression. Justice, he thought, demanded that they receive
full legal rights and access to any occupation that they might wish to
23 See id.
24 Aristotle argued, "the male is by nature fitter for command than the female." THE BASIC
XVORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1143 (POLITICA, Bk. I: ch. ii) (R. McKeon ed. 1941). It is interesting
to note Aristotle's list of gender differences:
Woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time
more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is furthermore more
prone to despondency and less hopeful than man, more void of shame or self-respect,
more false of speech, more deceptive and of more retentive memory. She is also more
wakeful, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a smaller quantity
of nutriment.
Id. at 637 (HISTORIA ANIMALIUM, Bk. IX: ch. I).
25 Id. at 1144-45 (POLITIcA, Bk. I: ch. 13).
26 See authority cited supra note 22.
27 J.S. MILL & H.T. MILL, ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 125 (A. Rossi ed. 1970).
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undertake. 28 As much as one might prefer Mill's views to Aristotle's,
both discuss gender differences within a framework that assumes that
the male gender needs no discussion; the sole issue to be discussed is
how different treatment for women can be justified or eliminated.
Like Plato, Mill offers exceptional women permission to behave as
men do; he does not offer an alternative vision of how women can be
both happy and virtuous in a predominantly male world. Even for
Mill, the historical oppression of women leaves them with only two
choices. They can behave as oppressed females or as males who are
not oppressed; there is no third or fourth or fifth alternative. That is
the gender dilemma: we collectively lack a vision of a person who is
virtuous, active, powerful, happy, and not male.29
Lenz and Myerhoff's vision of assimilation and transformation is
an attempt to remedy just this difficulty. Even if it does not accurately
describe the current state of affairs, it at least pictures women in the
process of building a future in which they are powerful, active, and
living in a society that has adapted to their needs. Some such aspi-
rations are what motivate many women who struggle with competing
demands of male and female roles. Whatever the deficiencies of its
factual foundation, the book does something useful by articulating this
vision and forcing us to examine it closely.
In making this examination, it is important not to forget that the
origin of societal notions about gender differences is found in the
historical power of men to define both male and female roles. Lenz
and Myerhoff do not overlook the fact of male power; their text is
filled with references to "dominant" male culture and male "hierar-
chies." But although they have not overlooked male power, neither
have they analyzed it. Their discussion of power is limited to a brief
attempt to distinguish male from female power. They describe male
power as "control and domination over others" (p. io). By contrast,
female power is:
acknowledgement, the willingness to admit one's weakness as well as
strengths; vulnerability, the recognition that our defenses are not im-
pregnable and cannot protect us from the pain that is part of living;
self-trust, the belief in one's own strength and integrity; and self-
acceptance, the ability to live in peace with oneself. (P. xi).
28 See id. at 189-203.
29 A similar point is acknowledged by D.H. Lawrence:
Man is willing to accept woman as equal, as a man in skirts, as an angel, a devil, a
baby-face, a machine, an instrument, a bosom, a womb, a pair of legs, a servant, an
encyclopedia, an ideal or an obscenity; the only thing he won't accept her as is a human
being, a real human being of the female sex.
This remark is quoted in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 633 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
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BOOK REVIEW
The distinction is made in order to clarify why women who so force-
fully criticize male power and domination can seek "empowerment"
in their own lives. Power in the male sense is bad; in the female
sense it is much to be desired.
We might well wonder whether this concept of "female power"
represents something that is really "female" or really "power." On the
one hand, it borrows from psychological accounts of adjustment and
self-knowledge: "self-trust, the belief in one's own strength and integ-
rity." People who possess such self knowledge are obviously stronger,
more "powerful," in some sense, than people who do not. On the
other hand, the references to "weakness," "vulnerability," and "the
pain that is a part of living" (p. i i) set the female tone. 30 Thus, when
examined closely, the authors' concept of "female power" seems ac-
tually to be a description of a mature adaption made by women to
the fact of their oppression.
Feminists have been discussing the nature of gender oppression
for some time. 3 1 I offer the following as a summary of this discussion.
Men, in general, dominate women and not the other way around.
Sometimes it is done overtly, as in the case of a rape; most times it
is done subtly, as in dominating a discussion by setting its agenda and
its ground rules. 3 2 It is notable both that men enjoy this domination
and that women submit to it even though it is not in their interest.
Powerless to set the terms of the discussion, women are powerless to
see that their interests are properly understood and counted. And
because any action that is not unilateral is arrived at through discus-
sion, this inability to be properly counted translates into a real dis-
advantage in material terms. Why, then, do women submit? Or,
putting the question more generally, given the wide variations among
individuals of both genders in degrees of assertiveness, why is it that
male culture is dominant?
The answer is not that women are submissive by nature; it is that
men have power. Power in this sense is not the "female" power that
Lenz and Myerhoff describe; it is the option to control another's
behavior by having the ability to make all alternatives to the desired
30 1 do not mean to suggest that well-adapted men do not experience themselves as weak
and vulnerable at some times. It is the centrality of these self-concepts that, for me, marks this
definition as "female."
31 For extended discussion of the nature of gender oppression, see S. DEBEAUTVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX (953); A. BRITTAN & M. MAYNARD, SEXISM, RACISM AND OPPRESSION (1984);
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 5 I5
(1982).
32 For a detailed analysis of how this occurs, see A. SCHAFF, WOMEN'S REALITY: AN
EMERGING FEMALE SYSTEM IN THE WHITE MALE SOCIETY 69 (i98i); Steinem, Men and
Women Talking, in OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 176 (1983). For the effect
of agenda on substantive outcome, see Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications,
63 VA. L. Rv. 561 (1977).
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conduct very costly. Physical power is basic. Although acts of phys-
ical aggression are often not visible to the wider society, the studies
of sexual harassment 33 and domestic violence34 strongly suggest that
it is absent neither from the workplace nor from the home. Institu-
tional power also gets results. The boss gets obedience because he
can make disobedience costly in ways both big and small. And if
physical superiority and institutional power were not enough, the
realities of economic power in this society frequently leave women
little choice but to seek the protection and the earning power of a
male companion.
It is not the case that all power in this society is exercised by
males against females. There are women who beat up men, women
bosses, and certainly women who are rich. Yet in the general run of
things, these women are exceptional. Women as a sex are poor. In
a world where most institutional power is held by men and where
few women are immune from their power, the occasional woman boss
does not constitute parity. Powerlessness is the central fact of female
experience, and the essential question to ask about "female" culture
concerns its relationship to powerlessness and the resultant gender
oppression.
The answer to this question, I think, can be found in the notion
of gender projection. 35 Consider the qualities that Lenz and Myerhoff
ascribe to women. Women are more understanding and more em-
pathic; women feel "a responsibility to discern and alleviate the real
and recognizable suffering in this world" (p. 9). Ask yourself the
following question: if you were going to be marooned on a desert
island with one other person, and you could define the characteristics
of that person, would you not choose someone with just those char-
acteristics that Lenz and Myerhoff ascribe to women? Now suppose
that it is not a desert island but a domestic one and that you and
those of your gender can define the characteristics of the other gender.
Would you not want the other gender to respond to individuals rather
than groups and to merge their individual interest into that of the
group? Would it not be better that "they" have an ethic of relating
and caring rather than a preoccupation with individual rights?
When one gender projects convenient characteristics upon the
other, it creates an obvious dilemma for that "other." It is good that
women are sensitive to and responsive to the pain of those around
33 See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 26 (1979). For studies
dealing specifically with the academic community, see B.W. DZIECH & L. WEINER, THE
LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 13 (1984).
34 Note also that it is not necessary for violence actually to occur; the threat of violence or
the mere presence of one who is physically larger can coerce behavior without the need for a
single blow.
3s See supra note 2 1.
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them. Yet when this quality is endlessly reinforced by a dominant
male culture, does this admittedly desirable characteristic impose costs
that individual women should not have to bear? For example, do
women respond to pain that is not their responsibility? Or, more
seriously, do women focus on the pain of others when responding to
their own would be more to the point?
These questions make clear why many women must be deeply
ambivalent about the issue of gender differences. 36 On the one hand,
these qualities are what several thousand years of culture have con-
vinced us are most valuable in ourselves as women persons. We
understandably value these characteristics highly in our women friends
and in the men we know who possess them. On the other hand, we
are beginning to see that they operate as a culture, in Lenz and
Myerhoff's terms, and that they provide both the framework within
which we "perceive and interpret the world" and the "solution to
common problems" of male and female interaction. The pervasiveness
of this framework, together with its origins in a male-dominated
world, should make us suspicious of those who want to celebrate
women by speaking of gender differences.
I do not mean to suggest that gender differences are not an im-
portant topic for study. Understanding how gender oppression works
is a good first step toward its elimination. But Lenz and Myerhoff
want to describe gender differences in a way that makes us feel good
about a state of affairs that is not good for women and makes women
feel responsible not only for their own lives but for the entire trans-
formation of society.3 7 Does this really help us to eliminate gender
oppression, or does it merely assist us in our continuing efforts to
adapt to that oppression?
This confusion between adaptation and liberation is a central con-
cern of feminist theory. For those who benefit from the status quo
there are normative theories that purport to justify it. Theories about
social contracts and choices from the initial position tell stories that
justify apparent unfairness. 38 If someone is not treated fairly under
the current state of affairs, these theories suggest that this unfair
treatment is just what that person would have chosen under the
relevant circumstances. They reaffirm the rights of some to do less
36 John Stuart Mill noted this ambivalence in 1869 in his essay The Subjection of Women.
He wrote that women "are declared to be better than men; an empty compliment, which must
provoke a bitter smile from every woman of spirit, since there is no other situation in life in
which it is the established order, and quite natural and suitable, that the better should obey
the worse." J.S. MILL & H.T. MILL, supra note 27, at 213.
37 For example, they assert that it is up to women with their "holistic" concerns about the
environment and nuclear war to affect public policy on this score (pp. 179-80). If women
cannot secure passage of the equal rights amendment, how can we expect them to affect highly
controversial questions of national policy?
38 See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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and get more. A different type of theory is held by those who are
disadvantaged by the status quo. Such people tell stories about change
and transformation, which suggest that people who do more and get
less must do more and get less in order to bring about the state of
affairs that they desire. We should be a little suspicious of such
stories, because they can provide internal reinforcement for oppressive
societal demands.
To see how real this concern is, we need only examine the next-
to-last chapter of The Feminization of America, in which the authors
begin to sound less like social scientists and more like writers for
Cosmopolitan. In this chapter they describe the "new" woman, the
"hybridized" woman (pp. 219-25). This woman always responds ap-
propriately - a veritable tiger in the boardroom or an affectionate
kitten in the bedroom; "her blazer/skirt uniform conceals sexy lingerie"
(p. 222). The perfection in her emotional responses has brought the
rewards of a perfect career and of a husband who is not threatened
by her superior success. "Her career has not only progressed better
than her husband's, but has also been financially more rewarding as
well as more rewarding in other ways" (p. 222). All in all, she is a
paragon who meets everyone else's expectations concerning her be-
havior. This story is familiar, and unfortunately, it is the standard
against which many women measure their own brave efforts at suc-
cess. It is no accident that they fall short; as women have learned
for countless centuries, it is not possible for a person to be all the
inconsistent things she is expected to be.
Lenz and Myerhoff's vision of feminine culture glorifies women
but never questions the gender identity that oppresses them. In con-
trast to the new woman's role, the new man's obligations are to
"enlarge his sphere of choices" and "relinquish his role as breadwinner"
(p. 203).39 This role simultaneously marginalizes men and frees them
from any responsibility for gender oppression. The authors claim that
women possess all the important characteristics for human happiness
and survival while men possess harmful and aggressive qualities; thus,
it is women and not men who must shoulder the burden of transform-
ing society. Although women will be assisted in this task by what the
authors call "new" men, these men seem to be nothing but women in
disguise. This "objectification"40 of the male gender leaves men in the
traditional female dilemma - if they want to do something useful
and valued, let them become persons of the preferred gender.
This approach is wrong not only because it does not treat men as
persons but also because it overlooks the fact that gender oppression
39 With so many women who are the sole support for children, it is highly questionable
whether feminists should be urging men to forego their role as breadwinner.
40 See supra note 2 1.
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cannot be solved without male cooperation.4 1 All men have the power
to oppress women less; powerful men have the power to transform
society. It further overlooks the fact that societal oppression is not
limited to women. It is a political victory that men sometimes make
coffee and care for children, but a political program that focuses
primarily on concerns of this type is not a program that will end
oppression. 42 In light of these facts, a sensible theory for social change
should not devalue concerns about justice and individual rights as
outmoded "male" values.
III. CONCLUSION
The question of "enough change" is complicated by the fact that
change is an illusive phenomenon. It is, at this time and place,
impossible to determine whether things are really changing for women
in ways that significantly improve their lives. There are more choices
for more women. Of that much we can be sure. We can and should
celebrate that fact. When, however, there are persuasive indications
that poverty, sexual assault, and violence continue to plague women
in large numbers, we should be careful that our celebrations do not
render their sufferings once again invisible.
I am also concerned that premature celebration not obscure the
extent to which the problem of female oppression has persisted in the
face of more choice for more women. Even women with more choices
must respond to an environment that makes many inconsistent and
competing demands and that is likely to discount women's needs and
interests. Lenz and Myerhoff seem to suggest that it is female culture
that will ultimately resolve this problem. Given, however, that female
culture is rooted in female oppression, it seems to me obvious that we
need to give serious attention to the project of reconstructing our
culture in ways that help us eliminate rather than adapt to female
oppression. The problem with theories of transformation and change
is that they lead us to draw false assurance from the future. We
need, instead, to focus on the present and to pose truly transformative
41 The separatists, of course, have a strategy that does not require male cooperation. See,
e.g., Frye, Some Reflections on Separatism and Power, in WOMEN AND VALUES: READINGS IN
RECENT FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY (M. Pearsall, ed. 1986); Penelope, The Mystery of Lesbians: I,
I LESBIAN ETHICS 7 (1984). This option seems to me to be wholly legitimate whenever it is
practical.
42 Bell Hooks, for example, argues that the feminist movement has failed to create a mass
movement to end sexist oppression because of its failure to recognize the diversity of concerns
that confront women on the margin. See B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO
CENTER (1984).
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questions. What do we want? What should we expect of ourselves?
Asking these questions will not "feminize" America, nor will it alter
the facts of male power and domination. However, in focusing on
these questions, perhaps we will be cooperating in our own oppression
less than when we tell ourselves that present sacrifice is warranted in
order to reach a "feminized" future.
